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1. Introduction
Many types of strategic interaction entail an element of rivalry in which costly re-
sources are irrevocably spent in an attempt to obtain a privileged position compared
to others.1 Hillman and Riley (1989) distinguished two main classes of game-theoretic
models of such rivalry. In a perfectly discriminating (or deterministic) contest, i.e.,
in a first-price all-pay auction, the prize is awarded always to the highest bidder.2 In
an imperfectly discriminating (or probabilistic) contest, however, a prize is allocated
according to a stochastic success function, where a higher bid raises the player’s prob-
ability of winning—but typically not too strongly.3 These two classes of models have
traditionally been analyzed separately and sometimes with different conclusions.4 In
fact, due to a lack of equilibrium characterizations, most work in the area has been
forced to restrict attention to technologies that are either perfectly discriminating or
very probabilistic, sometimes leaving doubts regarding the robustness of the results.5
The first paper that ventured into the no man’s land between the two extremes
was Baye et al. (1994). They showed that the symmetric two-player Tullock contest
with finite R ¡ 2 allows a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. That equilibrium was
found as the limit of equilibria corresponding to a sequence of contests with finite
strategy spaces. Since the size of the smallest positive bid in the finite contest turns
1For example, in a patent race (Loury, 1979; Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 1980), sunk and irreversible
research investments determine which firm is more likely to be the first in the market. For an
introduction to the literature on contests, see Konrad (2009).
2Early work includes Nalebuff and Stiglitz (1983), Moulin (1986), Hillman and Samet (1987),
and Hillman and Riley (1989). Baye et al. (1996) accomplished the game-theoretic analysis. The
model of the all-pay auction has been applied in various areas such as sales promotion (Varian,
1980; Narasimhan, 1988), competitive screening (Rosenthal and Weiss, 1984), interbank competition
(Broecker, 1990), monopoly (Ellingsen, 1991), political lobbying (Baye et al., 1993), and market
microstructure (Dennert, 1993). More recent extensions of the theoretical framework include Che
and Gale (1998), Clark and Riis (1998a), Konrad (2002), Siegel (2009, 2010), Klose and Kovenock
(2015), and Xiao (2016), among others.
3See, in particular, Rosen (1986), Nti (1997), and Cornes and Hartley (2005).
4For example, while in an all-pay auction, it may be optimal for a revenue-maximizing politician
to exclude the lobbyist with the highest valuation (Baye et al., 1993), this is never the case for the
lottery contest (Fang, 2002).
5Cf. Konrad and Kovenock (2009, p. 259): “A full characterization of equilibrium for contests
with small noise remains, up to now, an open question.”
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out to be an upper bound for any player’s equilibrium payoff, the limit construction
guarantees that rent dissipation in the symmetric equilibrium of the continuous con-
test must be complete. Che and Gale (2000) addressed related issues in a somewhat
different framework. Considering a contest of the difference form with uniform noise,
they identified two main classes of equilibria, and proved convergence to the equi-
librium of the all-pay auction. For success functions in the tradition of the Tullock
contest, however, Che and Gale (2000, p. 23) noted that it was not known if the qual-
itative properties of the mixed equilibrium in the all-pay auction, such as preemption
under heterogeneous valuations, would be similarly preserved if the success function
is slightly perturbed.
Substantial progress in this regard has been made by Alcade and Dahm (2010).
Specifically, they identified conditions under which a given probabilistic contest allows
an all-pay auction equilibrium that, as the term indicates, shares important charac-
teristics with an equilibrium of the corresponding all-pay auction.6 The construction
starts from a symmetric equilibrium with complete rent dissipation in a two-player
contest with homogeneous valuations, and subsequently exploits the fact that intro-
ducing a mass point at the zero bid of one player is equivalent to a proportional
reduction of the valuation of the other player.7 Since additional, lower-valuation
players have little incentive to enter the active contest, this indeed allows to con-
struct an all-pay auction equilibrium in the rent-seeking game. As Alcade and Dahm
(2010, p. 5) conclude, however, their results are partial without an improved under-
standing of the entire equilibrium set. As a matter of fact, it will be shown below
that additional, payoff-nonequivalent equilibria exist if the probabilistic contest is not
6If the corresponding all-pay auction has a unique equilibrium, then an all-pay auction equilibrium
is equivalent to that equilibrium in terms of participation probabilities, average bid levels, winning
probabilities, expected payoffs, and expected revenue. Otherwise, the definition requires equivalence
to an equilibrium in which all but two of the strongest players remain passive.
7For intuition, think of a player’s marginal incentives to raise a standing bid. When the opponent
decides to bid zero with a positive probability, those incentives are scaled down in proportion to the
probability that the opponent remains active.
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sufficiently “close” to the all-pay auction.
In this paper, the proximity of a given probabilistic contest to the all-pay auc-
tion is measured by the extent to which a player’s odds of winning, i.e., the ratio
between his respective probabilities of winning and losing, is raised by a small per-
centage change to his own bid. We call this measure decisiveness, and show that it
is closely related to a variety of existing concepts. Our central result says that, if a
probabilistic contest is sufficiently decisive, and if the corresponding all-pay auction
has a unique equilibrium, then actually any equilibrium of the probabilistic contest
is an all-pay auction equilibrium and is, consequently, both payoff-equivalent and
revenue-equivalent to the corresponding all-pay auction. Additional results cover the
remaining non-generic cases in which the corresponding all-pay auction allows either
multiple revenue-equivalent equilibria or multiple revenue-inequivalent equilibria. Fi-
nally, regarding the robustness of the all-pay auction, it is shown that payoffs resulting
from any equilibrium in the probabilistic contest converge to the unique payoff pro-
file of the corresponding all-pay auction as the decisiveness of the contest exceeds all
bounds. Taken together, these results offer a quite comprehensive characterization
of the equilibrium set, and thereby resolve the above-mentioned issues. Moreover,
powerful conclusions can be drawn in a wide range of specific applications.
The analysis proceeds as follows. After introducing a class of probabilistic n-player
contests with potentially heterogeneous valuations, it is shown first that a mixed-
strategy Nash equilibrium exists in any such contest. Then, the equilibrium set is
examined with a focus on the minimum of the support of the players’ bid distributions,
as previously done by Baye at al. (1994) and Alcade and Dahm (2010) in discrete
settings.8 In that part of the analysis, to accomplish the step from homogeneous
to heterogeneous valuations, we essentially reverse the construction of Alcade and
8For a discussion of the related analysis of Klumpp and Polborn (2006), see the applications
section.
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Dahm (2010). However, we also derive a couple of new inequalities for winning
probabilities when bids are close to each other. Finally, the tools developed mainly
for the characterization of the equilibrium set are re-used to establish the above-
mentioned robustness property of the all-pay auction.
The equilibrium characterization obtained for any sufficiently decisive n-player
contest provides additional and strong support for the view that the deterministic
relationship between bids and allocation assumed in the all-pay auction is a useful
simplification, in the sense that a probabilistic element could be introduced into
that relationship without affecting the equilibrium prediction too much. In a similar
vein, the all-pay auction is known to be robust with respect to the introduction of
private information. Indeed, as Amann and Leininger (1996) have shown, a symmetric
two-player all-pay auction with independent types has a unique Bayesian equilibrium
that converges to the complete information outcome as the distributions of valuations
degenerate.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 introduces the
set-up. Existence of a mixed-strategy equilibrium is established in Section 3. Section
4 contains the equilibrium characterization. Section 5 deals with the robustness of
the all-pay auction. Multiple equilibria are discussed in Section 6. Section 7 offers
applications. Section 8 concludes. All proofs have been collected in an Appendix.
2. Set-up and notation
We consider a set-up that is familiar from the standard analysis of the first-price all-
pay auction (Baye at al., 1996), yet with the modification that the highest bid need
not win with certainty.9 Thus, there are n ¥ 2 players i  1, ..., n that simultaneously
and independently choose a bid bi ¥ 0. Player i’s valuation of the prize, denoted by
9An even more flexible set-up is considered in the working paper version (2014). The present
article corresponds roughly to the second part of that paper. Using the standard set-up of a proba-
bilistic contest right from the beginning simplifies the exposition and allows us to do justice to the
specific implications of our arguments in the context of the all-pay auction.
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Vi, is assumed to be positive. Without loss of generality, players may then be renamed
such that V1 ¥ V2 ¥ ... ¥ Vn ¡ 0. By a contest success function Ψ, or CSF in short,
we mean a vector of functions Ψi : Rn  Ñ r0, 1s, one for each player i  1, ..., n, such
that
n¸
i1
Ψipb1, ..., bnq  1 (1)
for any profile of bids b  pb1, ..., bnq P Rn .10 Player i’s payoff is given by
uipbi, biq  Ψipbi, biqVi  bi.11 (2)
It is easy to see that bids exceeding Vi are strictly dominated by a zero bid. Thus,
it may be assumed without loss of generality that each player i  1, ..., n chooses his
bid from the compact interval Bi  r0, Vis. Given valuations pV1, ..., Vnq, we will refer
to the resulting non-cooperative game as the n-player contest with CSF Ψ.
The following four assumptions will be imposed on the contest technology.
Assumption 1. (Monotonicity) Ψipbi, biq is weakly increasing in bi, for any
i P t1, ..., nu and any bi P Rn1  ; moreover, Ψi,jpbi, bj, bi,jq is weakly declining in bj,
for any i, j P t1, ..., nu such that i  j, any bi P R , and any bi,j P Rn2  .
Assumption 2. (Zero bids) Ψip0, biq  0 for any i P t1, ..., nu and any bi  0i;
moreover, Ψipbi, biq ¡ 0 for any i P t1, ..., nu, any bi ¡ 0, and any bi P Rn1  .
Assumption 3. (Anonymity) Ψipbq  Ψϕpiqpbϕp1q, ..., bϕpnqq for any i P t1, ..., nu,
any b P Rn , and any permutation ϕ : t1, ..., nu Ñ t1, ..., nu.
Assumption 4. (Smoothness) Ψi is continuous on Rn zt0u, for any i P t1, ..., nu;
moreover, the partial derivative BΨipbi, biq{Bbi exists and is continuous in bi, for any
i P t1, ..., nu, any bi ¡ 0, and any bi P Rn1  .
10The axiomatic approach to CSF has been pioneered by Skaperdas (1996). For an overview on
recent developments, see Jia et al. (2013).
11Here and in the subsequent development, it will be convenient to use the notation Ψipbq 
Ψipbi, biq  Ψi,jpbi, bj , bi,jq, where bi  pb1, ..., bi1, bi 1, ..., bnq is the profile of bids of all players
except i, and bi,j  bj,i  pb1, ..., bi1, bi 1, ..., bj1, bj 1, ..., bnq is the profile of bids of all players
except i and j, with j  i. For better readability, we will also use the symbols 0, 0i and 0i,j to
denote the respective vectors of zero bids in Rn , Rn1  , and Rn2  .
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Assumption 1 requires a player’s probability of winning to be monotone increasing
in his own bid, and monotone decreasing in the bid of any other player. Assumption
2 says that a zero bid never wins against a positive bid, whereas a positive bid
always has a positive probability of winning. This assumption indeed imposes a
certain structure on the CSF.12 Assumption 3 says that any player’s probability to
win does not depend on his identity, i.e., not on his index i P t1, ..., nu, but only on
his bid and on the unordered vector of bids of the other players. This assumption
can be relaxed to a certain extent. In particular, as will be explained, our results
extend directly to the biased Tullock contest (which is not anonymous).13 Finally,
smoothness is assumed for convenience, and could probably be relaxed. For example,
the conclusions of Propositions 1 through 5 below hold for the all-pay auction even
though its technology does not satisfy Assumption 4.
The set-up is illustrated by the following examples that will be taken up later as
well.
Example 1. Following Tullock (1980), let
ΨTULi pbq  ΨTULi pb1, ..., bn;Rq 
bRi°n
j1 b
R
j
(3)
if b  pb1, ..., bnq  0, and ΨTULi p0q  1n , where R ¡ 0 is the usual parameter.
Example 2. The ratio-form CSF (Rosen, 1986) is given by
ΨRATi pbq  ΨRATi pb1, ..., bn;hq 
hpbiq
hpb1q   ...  hpbnq (4)
if b  0, and by ΨRATi p0q  1n otherwise, where h : R  Ñ R  is strictly increasing,
differentiable, and satisfies hp0q  0.
12Specifically, Assumption 2 excludes continuous games that possess slightly different properties.
For example, as pointed out by Che and Gale (2000), two players involved in a difference-form
contest may each have a small positive equilibrium payoff even when there is very little noise.
13In general, however, when the contest is not anonymous, even though one can still find conditions
that guarantee that at most one player has a positive equilibrium payoff, it can be more difficult to
identify that player, or to pin down the size of the equilibrium rent.
6
Example 3. The serial CSF (Alcade and Dahm, 2007) is given by
ΨSERi pbq  ΨSERi pb1, b2;αq 
$&%
1
2
pbi{bjqα if bi   bj
1  1
2
pbj{biqα if bi ¥ bj,
(5)
if b  p0, 0q, and by ΨSERi p0, 0q  12 otherwise, where α ¡ 0 is a scale parameter.14
Example 4. In a simultaneous electoral competition (Snyder, 1989; Klumpp and
Polborn, 2006), candidate i’s probability of winning a majority of an odd number of
p2s  1q districts is given as
ΨMAJi pbq  ΨMAJi pb1, b2; s, Rq (6)

2s 1¸
ts 1

2s  1
t


pΨTULi pb, Rqqtp1  ΨTULi pb, Rqq2s 1t, (7)
where R ¡ 0.15 This technology will be referred to as the majority CSF.
3. Existence
This section introduces some terminology regarding randomized strategies and es-
tablishes existence of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium for the considered class of
contests.
Following Dasgupta and Maskin (1986), a mixed strategy for player i is a probabil-
ity measure µi on the interval Bi  r0, Vis. Thus, for any measurable set Yi  r0, Vis,
the real number µipYiq is the probability that the bid realization chosen by player i is
contained in Yi. We write DpBiq for the set of player i’s mixed strategies. As usual,
pure strategies may be considered as degenerate probability measures. The support of
a mixed strategy µi P DpBiq will be denoted by Spµiq. Since the support is contained
in the compact interval Bi  r0, Vis, we may define bi  minSpµiq and b¯i  maxSpµiq.
Mass points at the zero bid level will play an important role in the analysis. We refer
14For expositional reasons, we restrict attention to the case of two players. Lemma 2 below holds,
however, also for the serial contest with any finite number of players.
15The binomial coefficient in (7) is defined as usual by
 
2s 1
t

 p2s 1q!t!p2s 1tq! . The assumption that
the district contest is of the Tullock form will be relaxed later in the paper.
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to pii  1  µipt0uq as player i’s probability of participation. Player i will be called
passive if pii  0, active if pii ¡ 0, and always active if pii  1. If some player i is
active, then his lowest positive bid will be defined as b i  infpSpµiqzt0uq ¥ 0. If
b i  0, then player i will be said to use arbitrarily small positive bids.
A mixed equilibrium is an n-tuple µ  pµ1 , ..., µnq, with µi P DpBiq, such that
each player maximizes his ex-ante expected payoff, i.e., such that
Eruipbi, biq|µi , µis  max
µiPDpBiq
Eruipbi, biq|µi, µis, (8)
for any i  1, ..., n, where µi  pµ1 , ..., µi1, µi 1, ..., µnq. For a given equilibrium
µ, denote by pi  ErΨipbi, biq|µi , µis and bi  Erbi|µi s, respectively, player i’s
ex-ante probability of winning and player i’s average bid level. Player i’s equilibrium
payoff, or rent, is then given as ui  pi Vi  bi . Clearly, because of the option to bid
zero, ui ¥ 0. Moreover, ui  Eruipbi, biq|µis for any bi P Spµi qzt0u.16 Finally, the
expected revenue is R  °ni1 bi , i.e., the total of players’ average bid levels.
To prove existence of a mixed equilibrium, one notes that any contest with het-
erogeneous valuations is strategically equivalent to a contest with homogeneous val-
uations but heterogeneous marginal costs. The latter case, however, has been dealt
with in prior work by Bagh (2010).17
Lemma 1. A mixed equilibrium µ exists in any n-player contest.
4. Equilibrium characterization
This section contains the central parts of the analysis. We start by introducing, on the
set of CSFs, a measure of proximity to the technology of the all-pay auction. Then,
16For a proof, see Lemma A.8 in the Appendix. To understand why the zero bid is excluded, think
of a two-player all-pay auction with valuations V1 ¡ V2. For player 1, any positive bid b1 P p0, V2s
yields the equilibrium payoff u1  V1  V2 ¡ 0, yet the zero bid, even though it is contained in the
support Spµ1 q  r0, V2s, yields strictly less, viz. pV1  V2q{2. The situation here is similar because
the CSF is discontinuous at the origin.
17Similar results that do not cover the present situation can be found in Baye et al. (1994), Yang
(1994), and Alcade and Dahm (2010).
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after explaining the logic of the main argument, the equilibrium characterizations are
presented, first for two players and subsequently for more than two players.
4.1 Measuring the proximity to the all-pay auction
For a given CSF Ψ, the ratio Qi  Ψi{p1  Ψiq will be referred to as player i’s odds
of winning. At a bid vector pbi, biq P Rn , the own-bid elasticity of player i’s odds of
winning is given as
ρi 
B lnQi
B ln bi 
bi
Ψip1  Ψiq 
BΨi
Bbi . (9)
One can convince oneself that, under the present assumptions, ρipbi, biq is well-
defined if bi ¡ 0 and bi P Rn1  zt0iu. Define now the decisiveness of the CSF Ψ by
ρ  ρpΨq  inftρipbi, biq : i P t1, ..., nu, bi ¡ 0, bi  0iu, i.e., as the joint infimum
of the functions ρi over the relevant domains.
18
The following result provides information about the decisiveness of the Tullock,
ratio-form, serial, and majority CSFs.
Lemma 2. ρpΨTULq  R, ρpΨRATq  infx¡0 xh1pxq{hpxq, ρpΨSERq  α, and
ρpΨMAJq  p2s 1q!
ps!q24s
R.
The lemma illustrates that the decisiveness notion is closely related to a variety of
existing concepts. In Tullock’s model, the parameter R is an immediate measure for
the proximity to the all-pay auction simply because, as R Ñ 8, the CSF converges
pointwise to the technology of the all-pay auction.19 The fact that the own-bid elastic-
ity of the odds of winning is constant and equal to R is the result of a straightforward
18As an elasticity, the decisiveness parameter allows the usual graphical interpretation. For in-
stance, in a pure lottery (i.e., a Tullock contest with parameter R  0), the odds of winning are
constant and equal to Qi  1{pn 1q, hence perfectly inelastic. At the other extreme, the all-pay
auction, the odds of winning jump from zero to infinity at the highest competing bid, and hence,
are perfectly elastic. We are interested here in the case where that elasticity is large but still finite.
19Consistent with this property, the parameter R has been interpreted alternatively as a measure
of military mass-effect (Hirshleifer, 1989), political culture (Che and Gale, 1997), noise (Jia, 2008),
and incomplete information (Eccles and Wegner, 2014), for instance.
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computation.20 More generally, the decisiveness of a contest of the ratio form can be
seen to correspond to the infimum of Rosen’s (1986) elasticity ηpxq  xh1pxq{hpxq
over all positive bid levels x ¡ 0. In the case of the serial contest, the own-bid elastic-
ity of the odds of winning assumes values in the interval pα, 2αs, where lower values
correspond to more unbalanced bidding. Here, taking the limit in the definition of de-
cisiveness is indeed necessary. Finally, the decisiveness of the majority contest turns
out to correspond to the probability of a given voter being pivotal in a random voting
model (Penrose, 1946), multiplied with the decisiveness of the individual contest. If
the district CSF Ψ is not of the Tullock type, then this relationship generalizes into
a useful lower bound, viz. ρpΨMAJq ¥ 2s 1
4s
 
2s
s
  ρpΨq ¡ ?s  ρpΨq.21 In particular, for
any given district CSF Ψ with ρpΨq ¡ 0, the majority contest becomes arbitrarily
decisive as the number of districts grows large.
4.2 Intuitive discussion of the main idea
The main observation of this paper is that a high decisiveness parameter renders
competition in an imperfectly discriminating contest nearly as ruthless as in the all-
pay auction. To understand why this is so, consider the best-response correspondence
in a two-player contest with ρ ¡ 2. Suppose that player 2 uses a mixed strategy µ2
with a positive lowest bid realization b2 ¡ 0. It is claimed that player 1 will then never
find it optimal to bid in the interval p0, b2s. Indeed, suppose that player 1 considers
submitting a bid b1 in that interval. Then, for any b2 in the support of player 2’s bid
distribution, Ψ1pb1, b2q ¤ Ψ1pb2, b2q  12 , by monotonicity and anonymity. Combining
20Indeed, as noted by Wang (2010, fn. 4), for any bi ¡ 0 and any bi  0i,
ρipbi, biq 
bi
ΨTULi p1  Ψ
TUL
i q
BΨTULi
Bbi

bip
°n
j1 b
R
j q
2
bRi p
°
ji b
R
j q
RbR1i p
°
ji b
R
j q
p
°n
j1 b
R
j q
2
 R. (10)
The claim follows.
21For the second inequality, see, e.g., Sasva´ri (1999).
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this with the fact that the decisiveness exceeds two leads to the key inequality22
BΨ1
Bb1 ¥
Ψ1
b1
 p1  Ψ1qlooomooon
¥1{2
 ρpΨqlomon
¡2
¡ Ψ1
b1
. (12)
From here, taking expectations, one arrives at
BE ru1|µ2s
Bb1  E
 BΨ1
Bb1
µ2V1  1 ¡ E Ψ1b1
µ2V1  1  E ru1|µ2sb1 , (13)
which says that, either player 1 incurs a loss (viz. if the right-hand side is negative),
or player 1 has a strict incentive to raise his bid (viz. if the right-hand side is weakly
positive). Thus, precisely as in the all-pay auction, it is never optimal for player 1 to
place a bid in the interval p0, b2s.
From the above, it follows that a given positive bid b1 ¡ 0 of player 1 can be
a best response only if player 2 uses, with some positive probability, bids strictly
below b1. Since this argument remains unchanged when the roles of players 1 and
2 are reversed, there is a sense in which the equilibrium unravels.23 But, because
the CSF is discontinuous at the origin, at least one player must be always active.
Thus, the other player cannot have a positive rent. This basic logic generalizes in a
straightforward way, and is used in the present paper to show that, in any n-player
contest with ρ ¡ 2, there is at most one player with a positive equilibrium payoff.
4.3 The case of two players
For the case of two players, the implications of this observation are particularly strong.
Specifically, using additional arguments that revert the construction in Alcade and
Dahm (2010), one can show that any rent necessarily accrues to player 1 and equals
22For example, for the Tullock contest with decisiveness R ¡ 2, inequality (12) reads
BΨ1pb1, b2q
Bb1

bR11
bR1   b
R
2

bR2
bR1   b
R
2
R ¡
bR11
bR1   b
R
2

Ψ1pb1, b2q
b1
. (11)
Further elaboration on this example as well as many additional results can be found in a companion
paper (2015). Special thanks goes to Casper de Vries for suggesting the separate documentation of
the Tullock case.
23I am indebted to Benny Moldovanu for suggesting this analogy.
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V1  V2. As a consequence, it turns out that any equilibrium of the imperfectly
discriminating contest shares several key characteristics with the unique equilibrium
of the corresponding all-pay auction (Hillman and Riley, 1989, Prop. 2).
Proposition 1. Consider a two-player contest with CSF Ψ and valuations V1 ¥ V2 ¡
0. Then, provided that ρpΨq ¡ 2, any mixed equilibrium µ satisfies the following three
properties:
(A1) Player 1 participates with probability pi1  1, uses arbitrarily small positive bids,
bids an average amount of b1  V2{2, wins with probability p1  1  V2{p2V1q, and
receives a rent of V1  V2.
(A2) Player 2 participates with probability pi2  V2{V1, uses arbitrarily small positive
bids, bids an average amount of b2  pV2q2{p2V1q, wins with probability p2  V2{p2V1q,
and receives no rent.
(A3) The expected revenue from the contest is R  RAPA  V2pV1   V2q{p2V1q.
The conclusions of Proposition 1 indeed match precisely those for the all-pay auction.
In particular, rent dissipation is complete in any equilibrium of any two-player contest
with homogeneous valuations and ρ ¡ 2.24
Proposition 1 strengthens the conclusions of Alcade and Dahm (2010) in two
ways. First, properties (A1-A3) are shown to hold for any mixed equilibrium of the
probabilistic contest, rather than for some equilibrium. Second, both players are
shown to use arbitrarily small positive bids. It is easy to see that this excludes, in
particular, the use of pure strategies.25 But also the assumptions of Proposition 1
differ from existing conditions. For example, as shown by Alcade and Dahm (2010),
24Uniqueness remains an interesting issue. For example, it would directly imply some results of the
present paper. However, proving uniqueness is not straightforward, e.g., because mixed equilibrium
strategies are not available in explicit form. Even in cases where equilibrium strategies have been
characterized, as in the Tullock case, it is not presently known if the equilibrium is unique for R ¡ 2.
25As noted by Rosen (1986), a pure-strategy equilibrium cannot exist in any two-player contest
of the ratio form if the elasticity η exceeds two at the local equilibrium. Similarly, it follows from
our results that a pure-strategy equilibrium cannot exist in any n-player contest with ρ ¡ 2.
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the two-player Tullock contest with parameter exactly equal to R  2 allows an all-
pay auction equilibrium. Yet this case is not covered by Proposition 1. Intuitively,
this makes sense because, in the considered equilibrium, at least one of the players
uses a pure strategy, which disallows the application of our methods. Similarly, an
all-pay auction equilibrium exists in the serial contest with parameter α  1, yet this
case is not covered by our arguments.26 In this sense, the present paper complements
the analysis of Alcade and Dahm (2010).
4.4 More than two players
The characterization of the equilibrium set complicates for n ¥ 3 players. One reason
for this is the well-known fact that the all-pay auction allows a continuum of equilibria
if V2  V3 (Baye et al., 1996). While those equilibria are all payoff-equivalent in the
sense that a preemptive rent of V1  V2 goes to player 1 whereas all other players go
empty, they need not be equivalent in terms of revenue. The following result starts
the analysis of the case of n ¥ 3 players by dealing with precisely those cases in which
the corresponding all-pay auction has a unique equilibrium.
Proposition 2. Consider an n-player contest with CSF Ψ and valuations V1 ¥
V2 ¡ V3 ¥ ... ¥ Vn ¡ 0. Then, provided that ρpΨq is sufficiently large, any mixed
equilibrium µ satisfies properties (A1-A3). Moreover, players 3, ..., n remain passive.
Proposition 2 may be understood as a variation of the corresponding uniqueness result
for the all-pay auction (Hillman and Riley, 1989, Prop. 4). The main point to prove
is that players 3, ..., n remain passive in any equilibrium. This is accomplished by
noting that if, say, player 3 was active, then players 1 and 2 could, in a sufficiently
decisive contest, each ensure a positive expected payoff by bidding player 3’s highest
bid realization b¯3. But this would imply that more than one player receives a positive
26However, the cases α P p1, 2s can be dealt with. This is because, in Proposition 1, the condition
on the decisiveness may be replaced by the somewhat weaker assumption that the own-bid elasticity
of the probability of winning for the player with the weakly lower bid is strictly larger than one.
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rent, which is impossible, as discussed above. Thus, provided that V2 ¡ V3, and that ρ
is sufficiently large, all but the two strongest players remain passive. However, as will
be explained later in the paper, this conclusion need not hold when the decisiveness
is merely larger than two.
Suppose, next, that at least three contestants share the highest valuation. In
this case, the all-pay auction allows a continuum of equilibria, all of which are still
equivalent in terms of payoffs and revenues. Following Baye et al. (1996), we are also
interested in the case of “symmetric” equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which players with
identical valuations use identical mixed strategies.
Proposition 3. Assume that V1  ...  Vm ¡ Vm 1 ¥ ... ¥ Vn ¡ 0, where m ¥ 3.
Then, for ρ sufficiently large, in any mixed equilibrium µ, there is a player i P
t1, ...,mu such that uj  0 for any j  i, players m   1 through n remain passive,
and the expected revenue from the contest satisfies R  V1  ui . In particular, all
“symmetric” equilibria entail complete rent-dissipation.
Thus, if more than two players share the same, highest valuation, then all players
with a strictly lower valuation remain passive, at most one of the active players earns
a positive rent, and that rent reduces the expected revenue in a zero-sum fashion
compared to full dissipation. In particular, payoff and revenue equivalence holds
under the assumptions of Proposition 3 when attention is restricted to “symmetric”
equilibria. For equilibria that are not “symmetric”, however, our findings leave the
theoretical possibility that one player has a small positive rent even if ρ is large.27
Finally, assume that one strong player fights against at least two weaker players
that share the same valuation. For the all-pay auction, payoff equivalence continues
to hold, yet revenue equivalence breaks down. For the probabilistic contest, one can
27Numerical computations suggest that this possibility might indeed be a real one. E.g., a three-
player Tullock contest allows staggering equilibria similar to those identified by Che and Gale (2000).
However, if two or more players are always active, then rent dissipation is necessarily complete, and
each of the always active players uses arbitrarily small positive bids, just as in the all-pay auction.
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still show that the strongest player receives a positive rent, while all other players go
empty. Moreover, as in the all-pay auction, the expected revenue from any equilibrium
is strictly lower than the second-highest valuation.
Proposition 4. Assume that V1 ¡ V2  ...  Vm ¡ Vm 1 ¥ ... ¥ Vn ¡ 0, where m ¥
3. Then, for ρ sufficiently large, in any mixed equilibrium µ, player 1 participates
with probability pi1  1 and receives a positive rent u1 ¡ 0, all other players have a
zero rent u2  ...  un  0, players m  1 through n remain passive, and the expected
revenue from the contest satisfies R  V2   p1pV1  V2q  u1   V2.
To elucidate the expression for the expected revenue somewhat, recall that in the all-
pay auction, u1  V1  V2 and p1  V1V2 b

1
V1
. Plugging this into the equation above
yields, after some manipulation, the well-known expression for the expected revenue
in the n-player all-pay auction, RAPA  V2
V1
V2   p1  V2V1 qb1 . Thus, like the previous
result, Proposition 4 leaves, compared to the prediction for the all-pay auction, one
additional degree of freedom.28 Overall, while Propositions 3 and 4 are somewhat less
explicit than their counterparts for the all-pay auction, powerful conclusions remain
feasible, as will be shown in the applications section.
5. Robustness of the all-pay auction
We arrive at the promised robustness result.
Proposition 5. Fix arbitrary valuations V1 ¥ V2 ¥ V3 ¥ ... ¥ Vn ¡ 0, and
δ ¡ 0. Then, provided that ρ is sufficiently large, any mixed equilibrium µ satis-
fies |u1  pV1  V2q|   δ, and uj   δ for j  2, ..., n.
Thus, for any finite number of players and arbitrary valuations, a small change in
the technology of the all-pay auction does not affect equilibrium payoffs very much.
For example, for the Tullock technology, Proposition 5 assures us that, for any given
28It is conjectured that the equilibrium rent for the strongest player may differ from V1 V2 even
if attention is restricted to “symmetric” equilibria.
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ordered set of valuations V1 ¥ V2 ¥ V3 ¥ ... ¥ Vn ¡ 0, and for any given level
of precision δ ¡ 0, there is a parameter value R such that for any R ¡ R, the
expected payoff of any player i  1, ..., n in any mixed equilibrium of the probabilistic
contest is δ-close to i’s expected payoff in the corresponding all-pay auction. Payoff
equivalence may be reached for some or all players already at a finite ρ, as follows from
Propositions 1 through 4. In general, however, the approximation seems necessary.29
The proof combines several arguments. First, it will be intuitively clear that, in
a sufficiently decisive contest, player 1 can secure a rent arbitrary close to V1  V2.
After all, player 1’s probability to win from overbidding all his competitors by a
small increment approaches one as the contest becomes very decisive. Conversely,
in a very decisive contest, player 2 need not accept that player 1 gets away with
a rent substantially larger than V1  V2, because that would imply that player 1
bids strictly below V2 with probability one, and hence could be overbid. Indeed, it
turns out that, even if there are additional bidders, such overbidding yields winning
probabilities arbitrarily close to the probability that player 1 achieves in equilibrium
with his highest bid realization b1. As a consequence, player 2 would be able to obtain
a positive payoff from overbidding. But then, two players would have a positive
equilibrium payoff, which is impossible. Thus, the limit payoff for player 1 is indeed
V1  V2, and zero for the other players, as in the corresponding all-pay auction.30
In prior work, Che and Gale (2000) obtained a related robustness result for con-
tests of the difference-form. Specifically, as the variance of the uniform noise vari-
able goes to zero, equilibrium bid distributions of the probabilistic contest converge
29Also, given that the equilibrium characterizations in the limit are tighter than those available
for an approximating sequence of probabilistic contests, Proposition 5 unfortunately cannot be used
as a tool for equilibrium selection.
30Is the expected revenue robust with respect to the introduction of noise? Provided that all
equilibria of the corresponding all-pay auction are revenue-equivalent to each other, our earlier
results imply that, indeed, Proposition 5 can be enriched by the conclusion that, like expected
payoffs, also the expected revenue is δ-close to that of the all-pay auction, i.e.,
RRAPA   δ.
However, it looks harder to get substantially beyond the inequality R   V2 in the case in which a
single strongest player fights against at least two equally strong but weaker opponents.
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uniformly to the unique equilibrium of the corresponding two-player all-pay auction.
Since uniform convergence implies convergence in the mean, this proves revenue equiv-
alence and, in particular, full rent dissipation in the case of homogeneous valuations.
The present paper complements their contribution by developing an alternative ap-
proach that allows deriving structurally similar results for another important class of
contest technologies, but covering also many cases in which an explicit characteriza-
tion of equilibrium strategies cannot be hoped for.
6. Payoff-nonequivalent equilibria
This section documents an important fact that also serves as a motivation for the
present paper. Specifically, it will be shown that, provided that the decisiveness
measure is not high enough, an n-player contest may possess, in addition to the
equilibrium identified by Alcade and Dahm (2010), another equilibrium that does
not resemble any equilibrium of the corresponding all-pay auction. The following
example illustrates this possibility.
Example 5. Consider a three-player Tullock contest with R  2. Assume that
valuations satisfy V1{V3  
?
2, and V3{V2  1  ε for ε ¡ 0 small. Then, there
is an equilibrium in which player 1 remains passive, player 2 bids b2  V3{2 with
probability 1, whereas player 3 chooses b3  V3{2 with probability 1  ε and b3  0
with probability ε.31 Since player 2 receives a positive rent, this equilibrium is not
payoff-equivalent to any equilibrium of the corresponding all-pay auction.
31Indeed, player 1’s expected payoff satisfies
Eru1pb1, b1q|µ

1s  p1  εq

b21V1
b21   V
2
3 {2
 b1


  ε

b21V1
b21   V
2
3 {4
 b1


(14)
 b1
"
p1  εq
V 21  2V
2
3  pV1  2b1q
2
4b21   2V
2
3
  ε
V 21  V
2
3  pV1  2b1q
2
4b21   V
2
3
*
(15)
¤ b1
"
p1  εq
V 21  2V
2
3
2V 23
  ε
V 21  V
2
3
V 23
*
, (16)
which, for ε sufficiently small, is negative for any b1 ¡ 0. Hence, b1  0 is optimal. The equilibrium
property for players 2 and 3 can be verified exactly as in Alcade and Dahm (2010, Ex. 3.3).
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The following result shows more generally that, for any number of players and arbi-
trarily high levels of decisiveness, there are robust specifications of valuation vectors
such that player 1 may find it optimal to stay entirely out of the contest—even if his
valuation is strictly higher than the valuation of any other player.
Proposition 6. For any R ¥ 2 and any n ¡ 2, there is a nonempty open set
of valuation vectors pV1, ..., Vnq such that the corresponding n-player Tullock contest
admits a mixed equilibrium µ that does not satisfy any of the conditions (A1-A3).
The proposition above shows that existing equilibrium characterizations for contests
with small noise are indeed of a partial nature. The result also helps to see why it is
essential to assume that the decisiveness is sufficiently high, rather than higher than
two, when the number of contestants exceeds two.32
7. Applications
This section illustrates the results by applying them in more specific set-ups.
7.1 Buyer lobbying
Ellingsen (1991) pointed out that buyer lobbying is socially desirable when a given
number of sellers strive to obtain a monopoly license through an all-pay auction.
As will be explained now, that policy conclusion remains valid in a somewhat noisy
environment. Specifically, without buyer lobbying, there are two or more sellers that
have an identical valuation of winning the contest, viz. the monopoly profit T ¡ 0
(the “Tullock costs”). From Propositions 1 and 3, for ρ large enough, total rent-
seeking expenditures are given by Rwithout  T  u,withouti , where i is the seller that
potentially manages to end up with a positive rent u,withouti ¥ 0. Since monopoly is
certain, the social waste in this case is Wwithout  H  Rwithout  H   T  u,withouti ,
where H ¡ 0 denotes “Harberger costs.” On the other hand, with lobbying, a buyer
32In an interesting recent paper, Amegashie (2012) has shown that, even in a two-player con-
test, an all-pay auction equilibrium may coexist with a payoff-nonequivalent equilibrium when the
assumptions of the present analysis are violated.
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organization with valuation H   T enters the contest. By Proposition 4, total rent-
seeking expenditures are given now by Rwith  T   p1H u,with1 , where p1 ¡ 0 is the
probability that the buyers win the contest, and u,with1 is their equilibrium payoff.
Social waste in this case is Wwith  p1  p1qH   Rwith  T   H  u,with1 . Thus,
buyer lobbying is socially desirable if u,with1 ¡ u,withouti . But for the all-pay auction,
u,with1  H ¡ 0  u,withouti . Hence, from Proposition 5, we may conclude that for ρ
large enough, buyer lobbying is indeed socially desirable, even if the political contest
is not perfectly discriminating, and regardless of the equilibrium.33 We have shown:
Corollary 1. If the contest is sufficiently decisive, buyer lobbying is socially desirable.
7.2 The exclusion principle
Baye et al. (1993) consider the problem of a revenue-maximizing politician that se-
lects, from a given set of lobbyists with known valuations V1 ¥ V2 ¥ ... ¥ Vn ¡ 0,
a subset of finalists that participate in an all-pay auction. Let k P t1, ..., nu be the
largest index such that Rk 

1   Vk 1
Vk
	
Vk 1
2
¥

1   Vi 1
Vi
	
Vi 1
2
for all i  1, ..., n.
For the all-pay auction, the maximum expected revenue of the politician is Rk, and
that revenue can be implemented by excluding all lobbyists j P t1, ..., k  1u.34 This
is equally true for any sufficiently decisive contest.
Corollary 2. In any sufficiently decisive contest, the politician optimally excludes
lobbyists j P t1, ..., k  1u, and earns an expected revenue of Rk.
To see this, denote by 11, 21, ... the indices of the finalists, in increasing order. If there
are only two finalists, or if there are more than two finalists and V21 ¡ V31 , then
revenue equivalence to the all-pay auction holds in the final by Propositions 1 and 2.
33This is even true when, as in Baye at al. (1996), only a proportion 0 ¤ λ ¤ 1 of lobbying
expenditures is assumed to be socially wasteful.
34Baye et al. (1993) exclude all lobbyists with valuations strictly exceeding Vk. Our solution yields
the same revenue, but leaves at most two lobbyists with valuation Vk in the final. For example, if
V1  50, V2  V3  V4  40, and V5  38, then our solution excludes lobbyist 1 and 2, rather than
only lobbyist 1. Either way, the expected revenue from the perfectly discriminating final is R  40.
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But otherwise, we have either V11  V21  V31 , which cannot yield more revenue than
the corresponding all-pay auction by Proposition 3, or V11 ¡ V21  V31 , which is even
strictly suboptimal by Proposition 4 because a final between 21 and 31 yields a higher
expected revenue of V21 . Clearly, these considerations imply the corollary above.
7.3 Electoral competition
In the simultaneous electoral competition model (Snyder, 1989; Klumpp and Polborn,
2006), two candidates participate in an odd number p2s  1q of probabilistic district
contests. There is a single prize, homogeneously valued, that is allocated to the
candidate that wins the majority of districts. Pure strategies will be assumed to
implement the same bid in all districts.35 Proposition 1, taken together with Lemma
2, implies now the following.
Corollary 3. Let Ψ be a district CSF with decisiveness ρ ¡ 0. If s ¥ 4
ρ2
, then any
mixed equilibrium between two candidates has the property of full rent dissipation.
This result clarifies and extends existing findings. Specifically, Corollary 3 accom-
plishes the game-theoretic analysis of mixed-strategy equilibria in simultaneous two-
candidate elections.36 Moreover, and in contrast to prior work, the present analysis
allows for a flexible class of district CSFs.
7.4 Biased Tullock contests
For arbitrary weights a1 ¡ 0, ..., an ¡ 0 such that
°n
i1 ai  1, let the biased
Tullock technology ΨBIAS be given by ΨBIASi ppbq  aipbRi {°nj1 ajpbRj if pb  0, and
ΨBIASi p0q  ai.37 Simple substitutions bi  a1{Ri pbi, for i  1, ..., n, transform the
biased game with payoffs puippbq  ΨBIASppbqpVipbi into an anonymous contest with CSF
35As noted by Klumpp and Polborn (2006), this is without loss of generality if the district CSF
Ψ is of the Tullock form with R ¤ 1. More generally, one can check (details omitted) that the same
is true if Ψipbi, bjq is logconcave in bi for any bj ¡ 0, as well as logconvex in bj for any bi ¡ 0.
36This may be considered useful, in particular, because the conclusion of Klumpp and Polborn
(2006, Lemma 2) never holds when players randomize.
37This CSF has been used widely in the literature. See, e.g., Clark and Riis (1998b), Hirshleifer
and Osborne (2001), and Bevia´ and Corcho´n (2010).
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ΨTUL  ΨTULpbq  ΨBIASppbq, unordered valuations Vi  a1{Ri pVi, and payoffs uipbq 
a
1{R
i puippbq. Thereby, our findings have immediate implications also for biased Tullock
contests. For example, Franke et al. (2014) proved that the optimally biased all-pay
auction extracts a revenue of pV1   V2q{2, and conjectured that this expression is an
upper bound also for the Tullock contest. Using Proposition 1, it is straightforward to
establish that the biased two-player contest with R ¡ 2 is, in fact, revenue-equivalent
to the biased all-pay auction, which allows to confirm their conjecture in this case.
Corollary 4. The optimally biased two-player Tullock contest with R ¡ 2 yields an
expected revenue of pV1   V2q{2.
7.5 Empirical measures of rent-seeking expenditures
The complete dissipation hypothesis is an important instrument for measuring the
welfare losses resulting from rent-seeking activities (Krueger, 1974; Posner, 1975).
The following result lends additional support to that hypothesis.
Corollary 5. Assume V1  ...  Vn  V . Then, provided that ρ ¡ nn1 , it holds that
u1  ...  un  0 and R  V in any symmetric equilibrium.
The improved lower bound on ρ follows by a straightforward adaptation of the proof
of Proposition 1, exploiting symmetry.38 Needless to say, complete rent dissipation
holds for homogeneous valuations in approximation in any equilibrium, symmetric or
not, as a consequence of Proposition 5, provided that ρ is sufficiently large.
7.6 Dynamic settings
In dynamic contests, the principle of backwards induction implies that decisions at an
earlier stage depend solely on expected payoffs in later stages. Hence, the properties
of payoff and revenue equivalence stated in Proposition 1 extend naturally to any
type of sequential pairwise tournament. E.g., elaborating on Groh et al. (2012),
38See also the companion paper, where a similar result is obtained for the Tullock contest.
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optimal seedings do not change when some noise enters the respective technologies
for semifinals and finals.39 Also the sequential multi-prize auction of Clark and Riis
(1998a) can be dealt with. Under their assumptions, the n-player all-pay auction in
each stage has a unique equilibrium, so that Proposition 2 applies if ρ is large enough.
8. Conclusion
In this paper, it has been shown that the relationship between contests with small
noise and the all-pay auction is much closer than previously thought. In particu-
lar, properties that prior work had derived for some equilibrium of the probabilistic
contest have been established, under a similar set of assumptions, for any equilib-
rium. The distinction is important because, as has been seen, even in a Tullock
contest with strictly heterogeneous valuations and R ¥ 2, there may be multiple,
payoff-nonequivalent equilibria if the decisiveness parameter is not sufficiently high.
While the equilibrium characterizations obtained for the probabilistic contest are
overall somewhat less explicit than their counterparts for the all-pay auction, several
specific applications have shown that the findings are sufficiently comprehensive to
allow powerful conclusions in many settings of interest. In particular, based on the
obtained findings for probabilistic contests, the analysis has established an important
and general rent-dissipation result in the theory of electoral competition. We have,
further, introduced with the decisiveness parameter a natural measure for the degree
of noise in a probabilistic contest that might be of some independent interest. The
analysis has, finally, provided a potentially useful existence result for mixed equilibria
in contests with heterogeneous valuations, and has revealed new properties of the
equilibrium set of the n-player Tullock contest.40
39Analogous conclusions may be drawn in dynamic contests considered by Rosen (1986), Agastya
and McAfee (2006), Klumpp and Polborn (2006), Konrad and Kovenock (2009), Sela (2012), and
Fu et al. (2015).
40In fact, the analysis paves the way for a complete characterization of equilibrium payoffs and
expected revenue in the two-player Tullock contest with heterogeneous valuations and any R P r0,8q,
as will be reported elsewhere.
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Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1. Suppose that, instead of maximizing ui, each player i  1, ..., n
maximizes normalized payoffs Uipbi, biq  uipbi,biqVi  Ψipbi, biq  biVi . Clearly, this
change of units does not affect the equilibrium set. For the resulting game, however,
existence of a mixed equilibrium has been shown by Bagh (2010). l
Proof of Lemma 2. The case of the Tullock contest is dealt with in the text. In
the case of the ratio form, Qipbq  hpbiq{
°
ji hpbjq, so that ρipbq  bih1pbiq{hpbiq.
The claim follows. Next, for the serial contest, simple calculations show that ρipbq 
α{p1  ΨSERi pbqq if bi   bj and ρipbq  α{ΨSERi pbq if bi ¥ bj. Hence, ρpΨSERq ¥ α.
But ΨSERi pbq Ñ 0 when bi Ñ 0 with bj ¡ 0 fixed. Therefore, ρpΨSERq  α. Finally,
consider the majority contest. Using Snyder (1989, Comment 4.2), one finds
BΨMAJi pb; s, Rq
Bbi  p2s  1q

2s
s


pΨTULi pb;Rqqsp1  ΨTULi pb;Rqqs
BΨTULi pb;Rq
Bbi . (17)
Combining this with ρpΨTULq  R, player i’s own-bid elasticity of the odds of winning
in the majority contest is seen to equal
ρipbq 
p2s  1q!
ps!q2
pΨTULi pb;Rqqs 1p1  ΨTULi pb;Rqqs 1
ΨMAJi pb; s, Rqp1  ΨMAJi pb; s, Rqq
R. (18)
Hence, ρipbq  pρipΨTULi pb;Rqq, where the function pρi : p0, 1q Ñ R  is given by
pρippq  p2s  1q!ps!q2 ps 1p1  pqs 1R °2s 1
ts 1
 
2s 1
t

ptp1  pq2s 1t  °st0  2s 1t ptp1  pq2s 1t . (19)
Since pρip12q  p2s 1q!ps!q24s R, it remains to be checked that pρi assumes its minimum at
p  1
2
. For this, note that differentiating lnpρi using relationship (17) yields
B lnpρi
Bp 
s  1
p
 ps  1q
 
2s 1
s

psp1  pqs°2s 1
ts 1
 
2s 1
t

ptp1  pq2s 1t 
s  1
1  p  
ps  1q 2s 1
s

psp1  pqs°s
t0
 
2s 1
t

ptp1  pq2s 1t
(20)
 s  1
p

°2s 1
ts 2
 
2s 1
t

ptp1  pq2s 1t°2s 1
ts 1
 
2s 1
t

ptp1  pq2s 1t 
s  1
1  p 
°s1
t0
 
2s 1
t

ptp1  pq2s 1t°s
t0
 
2s 1
t

ptp1  pq2s 1t .
(21)
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Multiplying through with the common denominator, and dividing by p1 pq4s 3, one
finds that the derivative pB lnpρi{Bpq is positive if and only if
s1¸
t0
 
2s 1
t s 2

Qt

s¸
t0
 
2s 1
t

Qt

¡

s¸
t0
 
2s 1
t s 1

Qt

s1¸
t0
 
2s 1
t

Qt

, (22)
where Q  p
1p
. Multiplying out, and collecting terms, this is seen to be equivalent
to the polynomial inequality ξpQq  °2s1t0 γtQt ¡ 0, with negative coefficients
γt 
¸t
t10
"
2s  1
t1   s  2




2s  1
t1   s  1

*
looooooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooooon
 0

2s  1
t t1


  0 (23)
for t P t0, ..., s 1u, and positive coefficients
γt 
s1¸
t1ts

2s  1
t1   s  2

"
2s  1
t t1




2s  1
t t1  1

*
looooooooooooooooomooooooooooooooooon
¡0
¡ 0 (24)
for t P ts, ..., 2s  1u. Hence, by Descartes’ rule of signs, ξpQq has precisely one
positive root, and as γ0   0, changes sign there from negative to positive. Since the
right-hand side of (20) vanishes at p  1
2
, this is indeed the minimum of pρi. l
The proofs of Propositions 1 through 6 are prepared with several lemmas.
Lemma A.1. Consider an n-player contest. Then, in any mixed equilibrium µ,
there are players i and j with i  j such that pii  1 and pij ¡ 0.
Proof. Suppose that pii   1 for all i  1, ..., n. Then player 1, say, could raise
his zero bids to some small ε ¡ 0, thereby increasing the probability to win against
coincident zero bids of players 2, ..., n from Ψ1p0q  1n to Ψ1pε,01q  1. Further, if
we had pij  0 for all j  i, then i could profitably shade his positive bids. l
The proof of the next lemma follows closely the discussion in the body of the paper.
Lemma A.2. Consider an n-player contest with ρ ¡ 2. Then, in any mixed equilib-
rium µ with pii  1 for some i P t1, ..., nu, it holds that (i) bj  0 for any j  i, and
(ii) uj  0 for any j  i.
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Proof. (i) To provoke a contradiction, suppose that bj ¡ 0 for some j  i. There are
three cases. Assume first that bj ¥ bi ¡ 0. Fix some arbitrary profile of bids bi 
pbj, bi,jq, where bj ¥ bj and bi,j P Rn2  . Then, from anonymity, 1 ¥ Ψi,jpbj, bj, q  
Ψj,ipbj, bj, q  2Ψi,jpbj, bj, q, so that Ψi,jpbj, bj, q ¤ 12 . Hence, if i lowers his bid from
bj to bi, monotonicity implies Ψi,jpbi, bj, q ¤ 12 . Therefore, p1Ψipbi, biqqρipbi, biq ¡
1, or equivalently, Ψipbi, biq{bi   BΨipbi, biq{Bbi. Taking expectations, and invoking
Lemma A.8, one finds
0 ¤ u

i
bi
 E

Ψipbi, biq
bi
µiVi  1   E  BΨipbi, biqBbi
µiVi  1. (25)
It is claimed now that the right-hand side of (25) is, in fact, weakly negative, which
yields the desired contradiction. For this, consider the differential quotient ψipbi, q 
Ψipbi,qΨipbi,q
bibi
, for bi ¡ bi. From monotonicity, ψipbi, q ¥ 0. Moreover, since bi is
optimal, Erψipbi, biq|µis ¤ 1{Vi. Therefore, using Fatou’s Lemma,
ErBΨipbi,biq
Bbi
|µis  Erlim inf
bi×bi
ψipbi, biq|µis ¤ lim inf
bi×bi
Erψipbi, biq|µis ¤ 1Vi . (26)
Plugging the resulting inequality into (25) proves the claim and completes the first
case. Assume next that bi ¡ bj ¡ 0. This case follows from the first by exchanging
the roles of players i and j. Assume, finally, that bi  0. In this case, pii  1 implies
b i  0. Hence, there is some b i P Spµi q with bj ¡ b i ¡ 0. The proof now proceeds
as in the first case, with bi replaced by b
 
i .
(ii) Consider some player j  i. Assume first that j is not always active. Then, by
Assumption 2, any zero bid submitted by j loses with certainty against i. Hence,
uj  0, as claimed. Assume next that j is always active. Since bj  0, this implies
b j  0. Hence, there is a sequence tbpνqj u8ν1 in Spµj qzt0u such that limνÑ8 bpνqj  0.
By Lemma A.8, uj  Erujpbpνqj , bjq |µjs, for any ν. Hence, by Lebesgue’s theorem,
uj  ErlimνÑ8 ujpbpνqj , bjq|µjs. If now bj  0j, then Assumptions 4 and 2
imply that limνÑ8 ujpbpνqj , bjq  ujp0, bjq  0. If, however, bj  0j, then by
25
Assumption 2, limνÑ8 ujpbpνqj ,0jq  limνÑ8pVj  bpνqj q  Vj. It follows that uj 
Vj 
±
kjp1  pikq  0. But pii  1 and i  j, so that uj  0, as claimed. l
Lemma A.3. Consider a mixed equilibrium µ  pµ1 , µ2q in a two-player contest
such that u1  u2  0. Then, V1  V2 and p1  p2  12 .
Proof. Since u2  0, a deviation by player 2 to player 1’s strategy µ1 returns a weakly
negative expected payoff, i.e., V2
2
 b1 ¤ 0. Combining this with u1  p1V1  b1  0
delivers p1V1 ¥ V22 . By symmetry, p2V2 ¥ V12 . Summing up, one obtains
p1V1   p2V2 ¥
V1   V2
2
, (27)
with p1   p2  1. If V1 ¡ V2, then (27) implies p2 ¤ 12 , so that, using p2V2 ¥ V12 , one
arrives at V1 ¤ V2, a contradiction. The case V1   V2 is similar. Hence, V1  V2, and
(27) is an equality. But then, p1V1 ¥ V22 and p2V2 ¥ V12 must be equalities as well.
Thus, also p1  p2  12 . l
Lemma A.4. Ψi,jpbi, 0, bi,jq ¤ 2Ψi,jpbi, bi, bi,jq, for any pbi, bi,jq P Rn1  .
Proof. Since winning probabilities across players sum up to one,
Ψi,jpbi, bj, bi,jq   Ψj,ipbj, bi, bj,iq  
¸
ki,j
Ψk,jpbk, bj, bk,jq  1, (28)
for any b P Rn . Evaluating at bj  bi, anonymity and monotonicity imply
2Ψi,jpbi, bi, bi,jq  1 
¸
ki,j
Ψk,jpbk, bi, bk,jq (29)
¥ 1 
¸
ki,j
Ψk,jpbk, 0, bk,jq (30)
¥ 1  Ψj,ip0, bi, bj,iq 
¸
ki,j
Ψk,jpbk, 0, bk,jq (31)
Using now (28) again with bj  0, the lemma follows. l
Lemma A.5. Fix κ ¡ 1. Then, provided that ρ is sufficiently large, Ψi,jpκbj, bj, bi,jq ¡
Ψi,jpbj, 0, bi,jq{κ for any bj ¡ 0 and any bi,j P Rn2  .
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Proof. Suppose that Ψi,jpκbj, bj, bi,jq ¤ Ψi,jpbj, 0, bi,jq{κ for some bj ¡ 0 and some
bi,j P Rn2  . Then, obviously, Ψi,jpκbj, bj, bi,jq ¤ 1{κ, and hence, by monotonicity,
Ψi,jpκ˜bj, bj, bi,jq ¤ 1{κ˜ for any κ˜ P r1, κs. Writing bi  pbj, bi,jq, this implies
B ln Ψipκ˜bj, biq
B ln κ˜  p1  Ψipκ˜bj, biqqρipκ˜bj, biq ¥ p1 
1
κ˜
qρ (32)
for any κ˜ P r1, κs. Consequently, using the fundamental theorem of calculus,
ln

Ψipκbj, biq
Ψipbj, biq



» κ
1
B ln Ψipκ˜bj, biq
B ln κ˜
dκ˜
κ˜
¥ plnκ  1
κ
 1qlooooooomooooooon
¡0
ρ. (33)
Since, for ρ large, the right-hand side of (33) exceeds all bounds, Ψi,jpκbj, bj, bi,jq ¡
2
κ
Ψi,jpbj, bj, bi,jq. Lemma A.4 with bi  bj leads then to the desired contradiction. l
Lemma A.6. Consider an n-player contest, and let κ ¡ 1. Then, for any i  j,
and for ρ sufficiently large, ErΨipκb¯j, biq|µis ¡ ErΨjpb¯j, bjq|µjs{κ in any mixed
equilibrium µ with bj ¡ 0.
Proof. For ρ large enough, monotonicity and Lemma A.5 imply Ψi,jpκb¯j, bj, q ¥
Ψi,jpκb¯j, b¯j, q ¡ Ψi,jpb¯j, 0, q{κ for any bj P Spµj q. Moreover, by anonymity and
monotonicity, Ψi,jpb¯j, 0, q  Ψj,ipb¯j, 0, q ¥ Ψj,ipb¯j, bi, q for any bi P R . Hence,
Ψi,jpκb¯j, bj, q ¡ Ψj,ipb¯j, bi, q{κ. Taking expectations w.r.t. µ, the claim follows. l
Lemma A.7. Fix Vi ¡ Vj, for some i  j. Then, in any n-player contest with ρ
sufficiently large, pij ¡ 0 implies ui ¡ 0.
Proof. Since pij ¡ 0, clearly b¯j ¡ 0. Hence, Lemma A.8 implies E

Ψjpb¯j, bjq
µj Vj
b¯j  uj ¥ 0. Multiplying through with κ 
a
Vi{Vj ¡ 1 delivers E

Ψjpb¯j ,bjq
κ
µj Vi
κb¯j ¥ 0. From Lemma A.6, E

Ψipκb¯j, biq
µi Viκb¯j ¡ 0, i.e., player i’s expected
payoff from choosing the bid level bi  κb¯j against µi is positive. Since the equilib-
rium strategy µi must perform at least as well as bi, it follows that u

i ¡ 0. l
Lemma A.8 Let µ be a mixed equilibrium in an n-player contest. Then, for any
player i P t1, ..., nu, (i) the equilibrium payoff function bi ÞÑ Eruipbi, biq|µis is
continuous at any bi ¡ 0, and (ii) ui  Eruipbi, biq|µis for any bi P Spµi qzt0u.
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Proof. (i) Let tbpνqi u8ν1 be a sequence of bids converging to some bi ¡ 0. Then, by
smoothness, the sequence tuipbpνqi , qu8ν1 converges pointwise to uipbi, q. Noting that
|uipbpνqi , q| ¤ maxtVi, bpνqi u for any ν, and that the convergent sequence tbpνqi u8ν1 is
necessarily bounded, the claim follows now directly from Lebesgue’s theorem.
(ii) Clearly, Eruipbi, biq|µis ¤ ui for any bi P R . To provoke a contradiction,
suppose that Eruipb0i , biq|µis   ui for some b0i P Spµi qzt0u. Then, by part (i),
there is an ε ¡ 0 such that Eruipbi, biq|µis   ui for all bi P N  pb0i  ε, b0i   εq.
But µi pN q ¡ 0, since N is an open neighborhood of b0i P Spµi q. Hence, one may
define a conditional probability distribution through µi pYiq  µi pYi XN q{µi pN q
for any measurable set Yi  r0, Vis. Moreover, Eruipbi, biq|µi , µis   ui . Denote
the complement of N by N c  r0, ViszN . Then µi pN cq ¡ 0 because, otherwise,
µi  µi , in conflict with the suboptimality of µi . Hence, one may also define
µ i pYiq  µi pYi XN cq{µi pN cq. Since µi  wµi  p1wqµ i , with w  µi pN q P p0, 1q,
it follows that
ui  wEruipbi, biq|µi , µisloooooooooooomoooooooooooon
 ui
 p1  wqEruipbi, biq|µ i , µis. (34)
But then, Eruipbi, biq|µ i , µis ¡ ui , which is the desired contradiction. l
Lemma A.9 Let bi ¡ 0 and ε ¡ 0. Then, for ρ sufficiently large, it holds that
Ψipbip1   εq, biq ¥ 1  ε for any bi P Rn1  satisfying bj ¤ bi for all j  i.
Proof. If Ψipbi, biq  1, then the claim follows directly from monotonicity. Assume,
therefore, that Ψipbi, biq   1. Then, monotonicity and anonymity imply Ψipbi, biq ¥
Ψipbi, ..., biq  1n . Hence, player i’s odds of winning satisfy Qipbi, biq  Ψipbi,biq1Ψipbi,biq ¥
1
n1
. If i raises his bid to b#i  p1 εqbi, then by the fundamental theorem of calculus,
ln
Qipb#i , biq
Qipbi, biq 
» b#i
bi
ρiprbi, biq drbirbi ¥ ρ lnp1   εq. (35)
Applying the exponential function delivers
Qipb#i , biq ¥ p1   εqρ Qipbi, biq ¥ p1   εqρ 
1
n 1. (36)
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But the right-hand side of inequality (36) grows above all finite bounds as ρ Ñ 8,
and so do player i’s odds of winning Qipb#i , biq, regardless of bi. Therefore, for ρ
large enough, Ψipb#i , biq  Qipb
#
i ,biq
1 Qipb
#
i ,biq
¥ 1  ε, as claimed. l
Proof of Proposition 1. Let µ  pµ1 , µ2q be any mixed equilibrium in the two-
player contest. By Lemma A.1, there are indices i, j P t1, 2u with i  j such that
pii  1 and pij P p0, 1s. We now revert the trick of Alcade and Dahm (2010). For
this, consider the modified contest in which the always active player’s valuation Vi is
weakly scaled down to V 1i  pijVi P p0, Vis. Define a mixed strategy pµj in the modified
contest via pµjpYjq  µj pYjzt0uq{pij, for any measurable set Yj  r0, Vjs. Intuitively,
strategy pµj samples only from the active part of µj . It is straightforward to check
that pµi , pµjq is a mixed equilibrium in the modified contest. In that equilibrium,
both players are always active. As a consequence, by Lemma A.2, both players use
arbitrarily small positive bids and have a zero rent in the modified contest. Lemma
A.3 implies now that Vj  V 1i , where V 1i  pijVi by construction. Hence, pij 
Vj{Vi. Yet pij is a probability, so that Vj ¤ Vi. Thus, i  1 and j  2 (necessarily
so if V1 ¡ V2, and without loss of generality if V1  V2). It follows that player
2 participates with probability pi2  V2{V1 in the original contest. Moreover, in
the modified contest, by Lemma A.3, each player wins with probability 1/2 and,
consequently, bids on average V2{2. In sum, player 1 realizes in the original contest
a rent of u1  pi2 V12   p1  pi2qV1  V22  V1  V2. The remaining claims are now
immediate. l
Proof of Proposition 2. Suppose there is a mixed equilibrium µ in which some
player j P t3, ..., nu is active. Then, since V1 ¥ V2 ¡ V3 ¥ Vj, Lemma A.7 implies
u1 ¡ 0 and u2 ¡ 0, provided that ρ is large enough. From Lemmas A.1 and A.2,
however, there can be at most one player with a positive rent in this case, which
yields a contradiction. The assertion follows now from Proposition 1. l
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Proof of Proposition 3. By Lemmas A.1 and A.2, some player i is always active,
and ui  0 for all j  i. Hence, assuming that ρ is large enough, Lemma A.7 implies
V1  Vi, or equivalently, i ¤ m. Recalling that at least two players have a valuation of
V1, a similar argument shows that pij  0 for any j  m 1, ..., n. As for the revenue,
note that uj  pjV1bj for all j  1, ...,m. Summing up yields ui  V1R. Finally,
if the equilibrium is “symmetric,” then necessarily u1  ...  um. Since m ¡ 1, this
is only feasible if ui  0. l
Proof of Proposition 4. By Lemma A.1, there are players i and j with j  i such
that pii  1 and pij ¡ 0. Since either i ¡ 1 or j ¡ 1, Lemma A.7 implies u1 ¡ 0.
By Lemma A.2, this is only possible if i  1 and u2  ...  un  0. Next, for any
k ¥ m   1, the inequality V2 ¡ Vk and Lemma A.7 imply that pik  0. As for the
expected revenue, note that b1  p1V1  ui , and that bk  pkV2 for k  2, ...,m.
Summing up yields R  V2   p1pV1  V2q  u1 , as claimed. To see that R   V2,
fix some small δ ¡ 0. By Proposition 5, u1 ¡ p1  δqpV1  V2q if ρ is large enough.
It therefore suffices to show that, for ρ large, p1 ¤ 1  δ in any mixed equilibrium.
Suppose that, instead, p1 ¡ 1 δ in some equilibrium µ. Then, obviously, pj   δ for
all j  2, ...,m. But, uj  pjV2  bj  0, so that bj   δV2. Hence, prpbj ¥ V22 q   2δ.
It follows that prpbj   V22 for j  2, ...,mq ¡ p1 2δqm1. Fix now some ε ¡ 0. Then,
for ρ large, Lemma A.9 implies that bidding p1 εqV2
2
yields player 1 a payoff strictly
above p1εqp12δqm1V1 p1 εqV22 . However, for δ and ε small enough, this is strictly
larger than p1  δqpV1  V2q, in conflict with Proposition 5. This completes the proof
of the proposition. l
Proof of Proposition 5. Fix valuations V1 ¥ V2 ¥ ... ¥ Vn ¡ 0 and δ ¡ 0. It is
shown first that, for ρ sufficiently large, u1 ¥ V1  V2  δ in any equilibrium µ. To
see this, let b#1  p1   εqV2, for some ε ¡ 0. Then, by Lemma A.9, for ρ sufficiently
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large, Ψ1pb#1 , b1q ¥ 1  ε holds for any b1 P r0, V2sn1. Hence,
u1 ¥ Eru1pb#1 , b1q|µ1s ¥ p1  εqV1  p1   εqV2  V1  V2  εpV1   V2q. (37)
Choosing ε  δ{pV1   V2q, the claim follows. Next, it is shown that, for ρ sufficiently
large, u1 ¤ V1  V2   δ in any mixed equilibrium. To provoke a contradiction,
suppose that u1 ¡ V1  V2   δ in some equilibrium µ. Then, u1 ¡ 0 and, hence,
via Lemma A.1, b¯1 ¡ 0. Therefore, by Lemma A.8, u1  ErΨ1pb¯1, b1q|µ1sV1  b¯1.
It follows that ErΨ1pb¯1, b1q|µ1sV2  b¯1 ¥ u1  pV1  V2q ¡ δ ¡ 0. Fix now a bid
b#2  p1   εqb¯1, for ε ¡ 0 small. Then, provided that ρ is large enough, Lemma A.6
implies ErΨ2pb#2 , b1q|µ2sV2  b#2 ¡ 0. Thus, u2 ¡ 0, which is impossible in view of
Lemma A.2. The claim follows. It remains to be shown that uj   δ for any j  1.
There are two cases. If V1  Vj, then, after exchanging the roles of players 1 and j,
the claim follows from earlier arguments. If, however, V1 ¡ Vj, then uj ¥ δ would
imply u1 ¡ 0 by Lemma A.7, which is impossible. This proves the proposition. l
Proof of Proposition 6. Fix valuations V1 ¡ V2 ¡ ... ¡ Vn, and some R ¥ 2.
Assume for the moment that player 1 remains passive. Then, as shown by Alcade
and Dahm (2010), there exists an all-pay auction equilibrium pµ2 , ..., µnq in the pn1q-
player contest between players 2 through n. In that equilibrium, only players 2 and
3 are active. Suppose now that player 1 considers entering the active contest with a
bid b1 ¡ 0. If player 1 were to face only µ2 (i.e., ignoring player 3), then player 1
would win with probability p12  E

bR1
bR1  b
R
2
µ2 ¡ 0, and have an expected payoff
of u12  p12V1  b1. We claim that u12 ¤ p12pV1  V3q. Suppose not. Then, in the
smaller contest, player 3’s expected payoff from a bid equal to b1 (instead of µ

3) would
amount to p12V3  b1  p12V1  b1  p12pV1  V3q ¡ 0, contradicting the fact that
pµ2 , ..., µnq is an all-pay auction equilibrium. Thus, indeed, u12 ¤ p12pV1  V3q. Note
next that player 1’s probability of winning, once µ3 is taken into account, is lowered
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by
E

bR1
bR1  b
R
2
 bR1
bR1  b
R
2  b
R
3
 µ2 , µ3   E  bR1bR1  bR2 p1  bR1  bR2bR1  bR2  bR3 q  µ2 , µ3  (38)
 E

bR1
bR1  b
R
2
E

bR3
bR1  b
R
2  b
R
3
 µ3  µ2  (39)
¥ E

bR1
bR1  b
R
2
 µ2   Er bR3 |µ3 s3V R1 (40)
¥ p12  pEr b3 |µ

3 sqR
3V R1
(41)
 p12  13V R1  p
V 23
2V2
qR (42)
¡ p12  12R 2  pV3V1 q2R, (43)
where Jensen’s inequality has been used. Therefore, player 1’s expected payoff from
bidding b1 in the n-player contest against µ

2 and µ

3 satisfies
E

bR1 V1
bR1   bR2   bR3
 b1
 µ2 , µ3    p12  "V1  V3  V12R 2  pV3V1 q2R
*
. (44)
If V1 and V3 are sufficiently close to each other, so that V1  V3   V1{2R 3 and
pV3{V1q2R ¡ 1{2, then the right-hand side of (44) is easily seen to be negative. Thus,
with µ1 giving all weight to the zero bid, pµ1 , µ2 , ..., µnq becomes an equilibrium in the
n-player contest. Moreover, u2  V2V3 ¡ 0, which is impossible in an all-pay auction
equilibrium. Finally, it is noted that R  V3pV2 V3q
2V2
differs from RAPA  V2pV1 V2q
2V1
unless V1V3pV2   V3q  V 22 pV1   V2q. Hence, R  RAPA on an nonempty open set of
valuation vectors. This completes the proof. l
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